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I. I N T R O D U C T I O N 
We are becoming more and more familiar with a simple but seemingly convincible 
narrative of international investment law: It is powerful - it bestows non-State 
actors with international rights that bite, it provides for rather effective 
mechanisms of international adjudication and enforcement — but it neglects the 
public interest.1 Whether or not this is a laudable pattern is much disputed and for 
the sake of this contribution I will leave it at that.2 The oddity that international 
investment arbitration as well as Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs)3 do not pay 
much attention to public interest concerns remains noteworthy nonetheless. As 
Gus van Harten4 has argued so forcefully, international investment arbitration 
exhibits most traits which characterize public law adjudication — above all, judicial 
control of the exercise of public authority and (public law) remedies for the abuse 
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1
 I will use 'public interest' as it is often used in international investment law literature as a broad term 
encompassing any legitimate regulatory interest a State is obligated to pursue or to promote under either 
domestic (constitutional) law or international law, cf. e.g. F. Baetens, 'Discrimination on the Basis of Nationality: 
Determining Likeness in Human Rights and Investment Law', in S.W. Schill (ed.), International Investment Law and 
Comparative Public Law 279 at 301 ff (Oxford U. Press 2010). 
2
 For a case to include public interest in international investment law see A. Kulick, Global Public Interest in 
International Investment Law (Cambridge U. Press 2012). 
3
 There are some remarkable exceptions such as the Norwegian Draft of 2008 and the Canadian Model BIT. 
Moreover, the trend seems to move towards at least mentioning more public interest issues in BITs, cf. e.g. the 
US Model BIT 2004. However, such BITs rarely give them teeth but mostly refer to public interests as mere 
aspirations without any mandatory nature. 
4
 See G. Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (Oxford U. Press 2007), particularly pp. 143 ff.; 
G. Van Harten and M. Loughlin, 'Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species oj Global Administrative Law', 17 Eur. J. 
Int'lL. 121 (2006). 
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of such authority in the form of effectively enforceable damages.5 Hence, a public 
law (adjudication) system that does not pay much attention to public interest 
appears a strange fact. However, a widespread consensus does seem to exist that 
this is actually a fact.6 As the tide suggests, I want to challenge that. 
My conclusion from the analysis of selected investment arbitration case law will 
be the following: While on the surface, investment tribunals reject or even refuse to 
consider public law issues on the merits, those arguments reappear where it 
actually counts - on the level of compensation and damages. Tribunals do not 
grant much prominence to public interest considerations and arguments when 
discussing and measuring the amount of damages; in fact they hardly even 
mention them. Nevertheless, I will argue that by setting extremely high standards 
or otherwise considerably lowering the amount of damages or compensation, the 
arbitrators implicitly take strong account of the public interest at hand. 
This article falls into three further parts. (I.). First, I will point at some rare 
occasions in which tribunals or (dissenting) arbitrators explicitly referred to public 
interest arguments in order to make their case (II.). Second, at the core of my 
contribution lies the analysis of selected investment arbitration case law dealing 
with public interest issues that follows the usual pattern, i.e. either explicidy 
rejecting or not mentioning public interest argumentation (III.). Third, the last 
section will amalgamate the results and seek to forge the conclusion that public 
interest considerations do actually play a role in international investment 
arbitration. Their existence is, however, a clandestine one. As it appears, as regards 
public interest, to the tribunals the action is not so much on the merits stage as 
rather on the level of compensation and damages. The doctrinal approach, 
however, needs considerable refinement (IV.). 
II. F O R E S H A D O W I N G : E X P R E S S R E F E R E N C E S T O 
PUBLIC I N T E R E S T 
As mentioned above, occasions are very rare in which arbitration tribunals have 
referred to public interests explicidy in order to corroborate their argumentation. 
I will briefly discuss two cases, Himpurna v. PIJSI7 and Ian Brownlie's Separate 
Opinion in CME v. Czech Republic.8 
In Himpurna, PLN, an Indonesian State-owned electricity utility refused to fulfill 
its contractual obligations owed to the investor, since the 1997 Asian crisis had 
5
 Also see A. Kulick, Book Review: S.W. Schill (ed.), International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law, 22 Eur. 
J. Int'l L. 917 (2011), and S.W. Schill,' International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law - An Introduction', in 
S.W. Schill (ed.), International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law 3 (Oxford U. Press 2010). Against the 
notion of international investment law as public law see M. Hirsch, 'Investment Tribunals and Human Rights: 
Divergent Paths', in P.M. Dupuy, F. Francioni and E.U. Petersmann (eds.), Human Rights in International Investment 
Law and Arbitration (Oxford U. Press 2009), 97, 107 ff. and my counter-arguments in Kulick, 922. 
6
 See instead of many van Harten, supra n. 4, 149 ff. 
7
 Himpurna California Energy Ltd v. PT (Persero) Perusahaan Listruik Negara (PLN), Final Award, 4 May 
1999, Yearbook of Commercial Arbitration XXV (2000), 13 (hereinafter: Himpurna v. PLN). 
8
 CME Czech Republic B. V. (The Netherlands) v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award, Separate Opinion by Ian 
Brownlie, 14 Mar. 2003 (hereinafter: CME v. Czech Republic, Separate Opinion Brownlie). 
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made the contract economically unviable. According to the investment contract, 
Himpurna was required to develop a geothermal energy facility in Indonesia by 
making large investments into the sector and PLN had to purchase electricity 
generated from the project. Although the issue came before an international 
commercial arbitration forum, the legal questions involved were essentially those 
typically to be found in investment arbitration. 
In the eyes of the Tribunal, while the crisis could not justify the breach, the 
investor's entitlement to lucrum cessans was considerably limited for, so the 
arbitrators held, claiming the full amount of lost profits would have constituted an 
abuse of rights: 
'The respondent did not seek actively to dispossess the claimant of valuable contractual rights; it 
has suffered helplessly from a precipitate deterioration in the macroeconomic value of the project 
with respect to which it had accepted the entire market risk. 
[T]he issue of lucrum cessans has so often come up in the context of cases where the defending 
State entity has acted to evict the foreign investor from a healthy on-going profitable venture. 
Thus die notion of the victim's lost profits has gone hand in glove with that of the breaching 
party's gain.'9 
In contrast to the latter scenario, the Tribunal found that in the present case 
Indonesia — through PLN — did not intend to enrich itself by appropriating 
Himpurna's benefits and hence the Tribunal concluded that this fact must have a 
'moderating effect' on the recovery of lucrum cessans.10 In other words, the Himpurna 
Tribunal emphasized the limiting influence of the crisis and the pressure that thus 
was put on the host State on the calculation of compensation and damages. 
Along those lines, in CME v. Czech Republic Professor Brownlie acknowledged the 
distinct challenges that a modern welfare State has to face, which owes myriads of 
obligations to its citizens in this regard. In his Separate Opinion Ian Brownlie 
argued that: 
'[a]ny assessment of the commercial approach to compensation in these proceedings must involve 
an adequate appreciation of the character of a bilateral investment treaty. [.. . ] 
In this context, it is simply unacceptable to insist that the subject-matter is exclusively 
commercial in character or that the interests at issue are, more or less, those of the investor. Such 
an approach involves setting aside a number of essential elements in a Treaty relation. The first 
element is the significance of the fact that the Respondent is a sovereign State, which is 
responsible for the well-being of its people. This is not to confer a privilege on the Czech Republic 
but only to recognize its special character and responsibilities. The Czech Republic is not a 
commercial entity. 
£•••] 
The resources of a corporation entail considerable flexibility in changing die location of assets 
and in changing the organization of assets. The resources of a country, its human and natural 
resources, are a given: they are necessarily fixed.'11 
9
 Himpurna v. PLN, p. 93, para. 332 and p. 94, para. 335. 
10
 Ibid., p. 96, para. 342. 
'' CME v. Czech Republic, Separate Opinion Brownlie, para. 73, 74 and 76. 
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Thus, in Brownlie's opinion, such limited flexibility is due to the host State's special 
role as a sovereign entity obligated to serve the wellbeing of its citizens. He 
maintained that such role requires a careful balancing of the investor's interest with 
the interest of the host State, which represents the interest of its population and 
rests on considerations of fairness that must find reflection in the eventual 
calculation of compensation and damages.12,13 The thrust of this argumentation is 
quite forceful. So far, however, it has remained a lonely voice in investment 
arbitration practice.14 
III. T H R E E CASES 
The three cases I have chosen for my analysis below, naturally, are a selection. As 
selections go, they might not fully reflect and capture all aspects of a topic. 
However, I deem these cases representative of the pattern that a broader and more 
widespread analysis exhibits.15 
(a) Azurix v. Argentina16 
(i) Facts, issues and the Tribunal's decision 
In 1999, American corporation Azurix, an Enron spin-off, won the bid for a 
thirty-year concession to run the water and sewage systems in the Argentine 
province of Buenos Aires paying United States Dollars (USD) 438.6 million as a 
so-called canon payment.17 By March 2000, customers complained about very low 
Ibid., paras 72 and 79. Furthermore, Brownlie notes the extremely high amount of compensation granted 
(more man USD 500 million) in relation to die Czech Republic's annual GDP (about USD 54 billion). With 
dius the damages amounting to 1 % of the Czech's Republic annual GDP, Brownlie asserts by reference to the 
Gulf of Maim case {Canada v. United States), ICJ Reports 1984, p. 342, para. 237, that signing a BIT must not 
result in liabilities 'likely to entail catastrophic repercussions for die livelihood and economic well-being of the 
population'. Also cf. S. Ripinsky and K. Williams, Damages in International Investment Law (British Institute of 
International and Comparative Law, 2008), 357. 
13
 Also note Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Limited v. Arab Republic of Egypt (ICSID Case No. ARB/84/3), 
Award, 20 May 1992, 3 ICSID Reports (1992), 189, para. 190 f, holding that the fact that the Claimant's 
business activities would have become internationally unlawful starting from die date of Egypt ratifying the 
UNESCO World Cultural Heritage Convention 'had 'significant consequences' in terms of determining the 
quantum of compensation.' See L. Liberti, 'The Relevance of Non-Investment Treaty Obligations in 
Assessing Compensation', in P.M. Dupuy, F. Francioni and E.U. Petersmann (eds.), Human Rights in International 
Investment Law and Arbitration (Oxford U. Press 2009), 557 at 562 ff. On the said UNESCO Convention see 
Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Adopted in Paris, 16 
Nov. 1972, available at http://whc.unesco.org/en/conventiontext. 
Not to mention that the majority in CME did not join Professor Brownlie's arguments. 
15
 For such analysis, I refer to die three last chapters of my recent book, dealing with the environment, human 
rights and the combat against corruption in international investment case law, see A. Kulick, supra n. 2. 
16
 Azurix Corp v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, 14 Jul. 2006 (hereinafter: Azurix v. Argentina). 
The dispute stretches over a considerable time period resulting in an (however, dismissed) application on 
annulment of die original award, see Azurix Corp v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Decision on the 
Application for Annulment of die Argentine Republic, 1 Sep. 2009. However, the ad hoc Committee's decision 
deals with issues not particularly relevant to our analysis beforehand and thus I consider it a venial sin not to 
further elaborate on the Azurix annulment award. 
17
 Ibid., para. 41. 
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water pressure. Moreover, half a million people's local water supply was intoxicated 
by bacteria. Customers were advised by authorities to boil tap water, to minimize 
exposure to water and not to pay their water bills. Eventually, Azurix terminated 
the Concession Contract in October 2001.18 The Tribunal summarizeed the issues 
and claims introduced by the parties as follows: 
'The Claimant contends that its investment in Argentina has been expropriated by measures of 
the Respondent tantamount to expropriation and that the Respondent has, in addition, violated 
its [BIT] obligations [. . . ] of fair and equitable treatment, non-discrimination and full protection 
and security; that such measures are actions or omissions of die Province or its instrumentalities 
that resulted in the non application of the tariff regime of the Concession for political reasons; that 
the Province did not complete certain works that were to remedy historical problems and were to 
be transferred to the Concessionaire upon completion; that the lack of support for the concession 
regime prevented ABA [Azurix' subsidiary] from obtaining financing for its Five Year Plan; that 
in 2001, the Province denied that the canon was recoverable through tariffs; and that 'political 
concerns were always privileged over the financial integrity of the Concession', and '[w]ith no 
hope of recovering its investments in the politicized regulatory scheme, ABA gave notice of 
termination of the Concession and was forced to file for bankruptcy'. 
The Respondent has disputed the allegations of the Claimant. For the Respondent, the dispute 
is a contractual dispute and the difficulties encountered by the Concessionaire in the Province 
were of its own making. In particular, the Respondent has argued that the case presented by the 
Claimant is intimately linked to Enron's business practices and its bankruptcy; that the price paid 
for the Concession was excessive and opportunistic and related to the forthcoming IPO of Azurix 
at the time Azurix bid for the Concession [. . . ] and that the Concessionaire did not comply with 
the Concession Agreement, in particular its investment obligations, and the actions of the 
Province, including the termination of the Concession Agreement by the Province, were 
justified.'19 
Azurix claimed USD 550 million in compensation alleging, inter alia, expropriation 
and failure to provide fair and equitable treatment. 
The Tribunal's view is adequately summarized in its following statement: 'The 
Tribunal understands that governments have to be vigilant and protect the public 
health of their citizens but the statements and actions of the provincial authorities 
contributed to the crisis rather than assisted in solving it.'20 The Tribunal found 
that Argentina's actions did not amount to an expropriation,21 for by applying a 
proportionality analysis in the assessment of whether an expropriation had 
actually occurred as done in Teemed?"2- the arbitrators opined that the degree of 
impact suffered by Azurix did not pass the relevant threshold in order to be 
regarded as expropriatory.23 Furthermore, the Tribunal held that Argentina did 
not provide fair and equitable treatment, since it engaged in political interference 
P. Thielborger, 'The Human Right to Water Versus Investor Rights: Double-Dilemma or Pseudo-Conflict?1, in P.M. 
Dupuy, F. Francioni and E.U. Petersmann (eds.), Human Rights in International Investment Law and Arbitration 487, 
496 (Oxford U. Press 2009). 
Azurix v. Argentina, para. 43 f. 
Ibid., para. 144. 
Ibid., para. 322. 
Tecnicas Medioambimtales Teemed SA. v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2, Award, 29 
May 2003, para. 122. 
Azurix v. Argentina, para. 322. 
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with the tariff regime and failed to complete the repairs that would have been 
required to avoid the intoxication of the water in the first place.24 
The Tribunal granted compensation in the amount of the fair market value of 
the concession,25 however, it refrained from allowing Azurix to recover the entire 
canon payment of USD 438.6 million. Instead, it decided that the canon payment 
should not be considered recoverable through periodic tariff increases. Rather, in 
the Tribunal's view, it was upon the investor to make the appropriate calculation as 
to the expected earning stream and to bid for the concession accordingly. In the 
words of the Tribunal: 
'[N]o well-informed investor, in March 2002, would have paid for the 
Concession the price (and more particularly, the Canon) paid by Azurix in mid-
1999, irrespective of the actions taken by the Province and of the economic 
situation of Argentina at that time.'26 
Nonetheless, the Tribunal stressed also Argentina's responsibility as to the loss in 
value of Azurix' investment.27 
(ii) Concealed relevance 
There are two aspects of the Tribunal's decision relevant for the analysis at hand. 
First, in its assessment of proportionality according to the Teemed standard28 the 
arbitrators could have easily referred to the right to water, e.g. the State's 
obligation to provide affordable access to clean water,29 as a factor to be considered 
in the balancing exercise of the proportionality stricto sensu.30 Admittedly, the 
Tribunal underlined the public interest implications of the dispute as a general 
matter. However, it shied away from undertaking a detailed balancing exercise 
where it would have been compelled to become more precise but instead came to 
its conclusion merely after a very cursory glance at the factors involved.31 
The second issue worth mentioning is the arbitrators' reasoning vis-a-vis 
compensation. The Tribunal held that Azurix merely was entitled to fair market 
value of the investment and thus could not retain the entire canon payment it had 
paid in order to obtain the concession. According to the arbitrators, a reasonable 
businessman could not have expected to recuperate the whole sum but merely a 
small fraction of the canon payment given the tariff policy agreed upon by Azurix 
Ibid., para. 376. 
Ibid., para. 424. 
Ibid., para. 426. 
Ibid., para. 428. 
See supra n. 22. 
See General Comment No. 15, UN Doc. E/C 12/2002/11 of 26 Nov. 2002, UN Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/a5458dldlbbd713fcl2 
56cc400389e94?Open document, para. 12 (c)(ii). On the right to water in general and its relations to 
international investment law see Thielborger, supra n. 18, 487. 
On proportionality in international investment law see the excellent piece of B. Kingsbury & S.W. Schill, 
'Public Law Concepts to Balance Investor's Rights with State Regulatory Actions in the Public Interest - the 
Concept of Proportionality, in S.W. Schill (ed.), International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law 
75(OxfordU. Press 2010). 
Cf. also Thielborger, supra n. 18, at 498. 
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and Argentina in the Concession Contract: '[N]o well-informed investor [ . . . ] 
would have paid for the Concession the price (and more particularly, the Canon) 
paid by Azurix.'32 Arguably, the tribunal thus implicitly applied a core principle 
inhering the right to water, i.e. the right to affordable access to water for 
everyone.33 It involves that States must ensure that water prices stay at an 
affordable level even if a private operator provides the water services and hence 
must adopt necessary measures, including appropriate pricing policies.34 Holding 
that Azurix could not expect recuperating the entire canon payment, the Azurix 
tribunal arguably followed the rationale that water tariffs had to remain below a 
certain threshold and thus could not be considered to fully amortize the price paid 
for the investment. Hence it appears that the Tribunal implicitly endorsed the right 
to water as an argumentative topos in its assessment of compensation to be granted 
to the investor.35 
(b) Biwater v. Tanzania36 
(i) Facts and issues 
The dispute roots in an intricate and highly complex factual matrix. In 2003, the 
Republic of Tanzania was awarded World Bank, African Development Bank and 
European Investment Bank loans in the amount of USD 140 million for the 
purpose of commissioning a comprehensive programme of repairs and upgrades 
to, and the expansion of, what was called 'the Dar es Salaam Water and Sewerage 
Infrastructure: the Dar es Salaam Water Supply and Sanitation Project'.37 As a 
condition of the funding, the three development banks obliged Tanzania to 
appoint a private operator to manage and operate the water and sewerage system 
and carry out some of the works associated with the Project.38 
The government therefore invited tenders for the project in 2002 and eventually 
chose Biwater Gauff Tanzania (BGT) to execute it. Biwater, a British company, 
held 80% and Gauff, a German company, held 20% of the shares in their joint 
venture BGT.39 Moreover, Biwater and Gauff incorporated City Water Services 
Limited (City Water) under the laws of Tanzania on 17 December 2002, as the 
company operating the water and sewerage infrastructure. At the time of the 
proceedings, BGT held 51 % of the shares in City Water, and Super Doll Trailer 
Manufacture Co. Ltd (STM), a Tanzanian company, held the remaining 49%.40 
32
 Azurix v. Argentina, para. 426. 
33
 See General Comment No. 15, para. 12 (c)(ii). 
34
 See Thielborger, supra n. 18, at 498. 
35
 Ibid. 
36
 Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award, 24 Jul. 2008 
(hereinafter: Biwater v. Tanzania). 
1
 Biwater v. Tanzania, para. 3. 
38
 Ibid. 
39
 Ibid., para. 4. 
40
 Ibid. 
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City Water, as the operating company, entered into three key contracts for the 
implementation of the Project with the Dar es Salaam Water and Sewerage 
Authority (DAWASA) on 19 February 2003, including, inter alia, the Water and 
Sewerage Lease Contract. 
The incidents leading to the dispute started to unfold when City Water failed to 
considerably improve the dire water supply situation in Dar es Salaam, even taking 
into account DAWASA's prior failures and shortcomings.41 Additionally, City 
Water experienced serious financial distress due to miscalculations, performance 
shortcomings and considerably lower tariff collections compared with DAWASA's 
prior to the takeover by City Water.42 Regarding the subsequent events, the 
tribunal elaborates: 
'Between 13 May 2005 and 1 June 2005, a series of events took place which, according to BGT, 
constituted breaches by the Republic of its obligations under international and domestic law. By 
way of overview: 
- on 13 May 2005, the Minister of Water and Livestock Development purported to terminate 
the Lease Contract; 
- on 16 May 2005, a call was made on the entire amount of the Performance Bond 
- established by City Water in connection with die Lease Contract; 
- on 17 May 2005, DAWASA issued a cure notice for the reinstatement of the Performance 
Bond under Article 50.1 of die Lease Contract; 
- on 24 May 2005, the Tanzania Revenue Authority withdrew a VAT exemption; 
- on 25 May 2005, DAWASA issued a Notice to Terminate under Article 51.3 of the Lease 
Contract, on the ground of failure to remedy the alleged breach notified in the cure notice of 
17 May 2005; and finally 
- on 1 June 2005, City Water's senior management were deported, and representatives of the 
Republic and DAWASA seized the company's assets, installed a new management 
(representatives of DAWASCO, a newly formed Government entity) and took over City 
Water's business.'43 
In the following arbitration before the International Centre for the Setdement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID), Biwater and Gauffjointly claimed violation of their 
right to fair and equitable treatment as well as prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation upon alleged expropriation under the Agreement between the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United Republic 
of Tanzania for the Promotion and Protection of Investments of 2 August 1996.44 
41
 Ibid, para. 147. 
42
 Ibid., para. 178. 
43
 Ibid., para. 15. 
44
 Ibid., para. 16. 
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(ii) Amicable towards environmental issues — but not explicitly so 
While deciding on the viability of amicus curiae45 briefs, the Tribunal stated that it 
'[was] mandated to resolve claims as between BGT and the Republic, but also 
recognized that this arbitration raise [d] a number of issues of concern to the wider 
community in Tanzania.'46 Having been admitted to set out their opinions, 
however without being granted access to the parties' submissions, the amici 
underlined that the environmental issues the dispute entailed required the 
investors to meet 'the highest level of responsibility to meet their duties and 
obligations as foreign investors before seeking protection under international law'. 
According to the amici, the investors' breach of their responsibility was to be found 
in their miscalculations and other shortcomings,47 for given the importance of 
their investment for the population from an environmental perspective they should 
have acted with due diligence in order to warrant the water supply.48 In a nutshell, 
the amici argued: The higher the public interest concerns, the higher the threshold 
the investor has to pass in order to claim compensation. 
In the beginning of the Tribunal's subsequent analysis it seems to prove immune 
to the amici's reasoning: BGT succeeded with its claim regarding the breach of the 
expropriation clause of the UK-Tanzania BIT.49 However, and here comes the 
intriguing part of the award, BGT eventually was not awarded any kind of 
compensation for the Tribunal declined to find for any monetary losses caused by 
the aforementioned violations.50 According to the arbitrators, the damages and 
financial setbacks from which BGT suffered were due to their own miscalculations 
and thus BGT's investment already was lacking any economic value when its rights 
under the BIT were violated. 
Considering this finding, it appears the Tribunal proved much more 
sympathetic to the amici's allegations than it was ready to admit. It is notable that 
the standard for causation, derived from a thorough analysis of established 
customary international law rules, played out to be applied very strictly — one 
might say much more strictly than one might have anticipated.51 Though it did 
refrain from making any specific reference to the environmental issues involved, it 
is hard to ignore that there remains a distinct flavour of the acknowledged public 
interest concerns as the actually driving force in the Tribunal's considerations - at 
On amicus curiae briefs in general as practiced under the Anglo-American doctrine see S. Krislov, 'The 
Amicus Curiae Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy', Yak L.J. 72 (1962-1963), 694; G. A. Caldeira and J. R. 
Wright, 'Amici Curiae before the Supreme Court: Who Participates, When, and How Much?) 52 J. of Pol. 782 (1990). 
Biwater v. Tanzania., para. 358. To corroborate its point, the tribunal also cited the Methanex dictum: 'there is 
an undoubtedly public interest in this arbitration.' See Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, 
UNCITRAL (NAFTA), Final Award, 3 Aug. 2005, para. 141. 
See Biwater v. Tanzania., para. 358. 
Biwater v. Tanzania, para. 380 f. 
Ibid., para. 519. 
Ibid., para. 807. 
See ibid., para. 790 ff. 
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least as regards the standard-setting for causation of compensation and its 
application.52 
(c) Glamis v. US53 
ft) Facts, issues and the Tribunal's findings 
Glamis Gold, Ltd. 'was a publicly held Canadian corporation engaged in the 
exploration, development and extraction of precious metals in the United States 
and Latin America'54 that, in 2006, merged with another Canadian company 
named Goldcorp, Inc. Starting from 1987, through its US subsidiary, Glamis had 
been acquiring mining claims and mill sites in the Imperial Desert in Southeastern 
California and attained full ownership of what it called 'The Imperial Project' site 
in 1994. According to the factual summary, 
'[tjhrough open-pit mining techniques, [Glamis] planned to mine gold and silver with the 
expectation of removing 150 million tons of ore, and 300 million tons of waste rock, from three 
large open pits during the Project's projected 19-year life (from 1998 to 2017).'55 
The regulatory landscape in which mining developers have to manoeuvre in 
California is highly complex. However, three statutes may be identified as the most 
relevant relating to the dispute at hand: First, the 1872 Mining Law bestows any 
US citizen with the right to enter federal public lands and acquire ownership of a 
limited area of land, if he or she is able to prove the valuable and marketable 
discovery of hardrock minerals. Second, the 1976 Federal Law Policy and 
Management Act enables the US Department of the Interior to impose and to 
manage specific protections regarding the federal public land within the California 
Desert Conservation Area (CDCA), a zone created by the Act and designed to 
preserve areas of significant scenic and biological importance and surrounding the 
Imperial Project site.56 The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) is competent to 
prepare and implement a comprehensive plan for operation, development and 
protection of the public land.57 Third, according to the California Desert 
Protection Act of 1994 (CDPA) mining or development is prohibited on a vast area 
in the neighbourhood of the Imperial Project.58 
Glamis claimed to have been assured by BLM, which approved the Project in 
1996, that its investment would remain 'comfortably outside of the wilderness areas 
See ibid., para. 787 ff. 
Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States of America, Award, 8 Jun. 2009, NAFTA, available at http://www.state.gov/ 
s/l/cl0986.htm (hereinafter: Glamis v. US). 
Glamis v. US, Memorial of Claimant Glamis Gold, Ltd., para. 19. 
Glamis v. US, para. 33. 
Ibid., paras. 41 to 43. Also cf. J. Cantegreil, 'Implementing Human Rights in the NAFTA Regime - The Potential of a 
Pending Case: Glamis Corp v. USA) in P.M. Dupuy, F. Francioni and E.U. Petersmann (eds.), Human Rights in 
International Investment Law and Arbitration 367 at 371 (Oxford U. Press 2009). 
Ibid. 
Glamis v. US, para. 65 fF. 
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designated by the CDPA'.59 However, the Quechuan Indian Nation, the 
organization representing the indigenous Indian tribe of the Quechuans would 
soon intervene and allege that the Imperial Project's proximity to its sacred 
ancestral sites would put their spiritual and ceremonial practices in grave peril, by 
which they use to transmit their culture to new generations.60 According to their 
Non-Party Supplemental Submission, the Quechuans claimed that, inter alia, due 
to several provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) as well as the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples61 the 
Imperial Project could not be executed.62 Thus, in January 2001, the BLM 
reversed its decision and the US Secretary of the Interior denied the mining 
permit. Moreover, subsequently, the California legislature adopted several 
additional measures that Glamis later on asserted as having further obstructed its 
investment.63 On 9 December 2003, Glamis filed a Notice of Arbitration against 
the United States under Chapter Eleven of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), 'claim [ing] that the United States, through both the federal 
and state actions, expropriated Glamis' mining rights in violation of Article 1110 of 
the NAFTA and that the United States, through both the federal and state actions, 
denied Glamis the fair and equitable treatment required by Article 1105 of the 
NAFTA.'64 
In turn, the Quechuans countered in their Non-party Supplemental Submission 
that: 
'under NAFTA Article 1131(1) [providing that a Tribunal adjudicating a claim under Chapter 11 
'shall decide die issues in dispute in accordance with [the NAFTA] and applicable rules of 
international law'], the Tribunal is required to be mindful of how it construes the provisions at 
issue in this claim, Articles 1105 and 1110, so that they do not require or authorize State conduct 
of the kind that would conflict with international norms protecting indigenous people generally, 
and the citizens of the Quechan Tribe in particular. Such an approach is the only way to ensure 
consistency in wider public international law and is also mandated in the customary international 
law rules on treaty interpretation, as restated in Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties'65 
The Tribunal, in a very elaborate and lengthy award comprising 362 pages 
eventually found no violation of the NAFTA, neither of the expropriation nor of 
the minimum standard of treatment clauses. As to Article 1110 (expropriation), it 
held that Glamis' investment was not rendered substantially without value by the 
Glamis v. US, Notice of Arbitration, para. 6. 
Glamis v. US, Counter-Memorial of Respondent United States of America, paras. 50 ff.; Glamis v. US, 
Non-Party Supplemental Submission of the Quechuan Indian Nation, p. 1. 
UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UN GA Res. 61/295, 13 Sep. 2007, available at http 
://issuu.com/karinzylsaw/docs/un_dedaration_rights_mdigenous_peoples?mode=embed&layout=http%3 
A%2F%2Fskin.issuu.com%2Fv%2Fdark%2Flayout.xml&showFlipBtn=true. 
Ibid., p. 5 f. 
Cantegreil, supra n. 56, 372. 
Glamis v. US, para. 11. 
Glamis v. US, Non-Party Supplemental Submission of the Quechuan Indian Nation, p. 8 (emphasis in the 
original). 
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measures adopted by the US government and the Californian legislature.66 In its 
view 
'the first factor in any expropriation analysis is not met: the complained of measures did not cause 
a sufficient economic impact to the Imperial Project to effect an expropriation of Glamis' 
investment.'67 
Furthermore, the Tribunal also stroke down Glamis' claim regarding a breach of 
the international minimum standard enshrined in NAFTA Article 1105. Defining 
the crucial threshold along the lines of the 1926 Neer case,68 the Tribunal did not 
see any grounds for the adopted measures and legislation violating the said 
standard. Rather, it opined that given the location of the Imperial Project next to 
the CDCA and in the proximity of the Quechuan Indians, Glamis was not entided 
to compensation for the BLM revising its decision and the subsequent measures by 
the US Department of the Interior and the California State legislature.69 However, 
the Tribunal expressly declined to consider the human rights arguments as 
brought forward by the Quechuan Indian Nation. 
(ii) A different solution 
When reading the Glamis award, it stands out that the extremely long decision 
never direcdy addresses human rights or other public interest considerations per se. 
Admittedly, elaborate passages, particularly vis-a-vis the Claimants' allegations 
regarding the international minimum standard in Article 1105 of the NAFTA, deal 
with the US and California measures targeted at protecting the interests of the 
Quechuan Indians. However, the tribunal treats them as any other legislation or 
administrative decisions the effect of which it has to consider in light of NAFTA 
Chapter 11. It does not even mention, let alone assess the validity or viability of 
human rights provisions or soft law instruments such as the ICCPR or the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. In other words, what the tribunal 
seems to implicitly convey is that human rights arguments may exclusively ground 
in domestic legislation, but lack applicability — despite the quite broad wording of 
NAFTA Article 1131 (1) — as an international law claim. Such limitation to 
domestic law, however, basically means to marginalize human rights 
considerations as an independent argumentative topos: For the tribunal, the content 
of the measure itself— the public interest, i.e. in the present case the human and 
minority rights considerations — was rather irrelevant. What interested the 
tribunal, was exclusively the question whether the measures adopted by the host 
State met the conditions as set forth in the Neer case, i.e. amount to an 'outrage, to 
bad faith, to wilful neglect of duty, or to an insufficiency of governmental action so 
Glamis v. US, paras. 328 ff. 
Ibid., para. 17 citing to paras. 534 to 536. 
Mer v. Mexico, 15 Oct. 1926, 4 R. Int'l Arb. Awards, 60. 
Ibid., para. 824 ff. 
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far short of international standards that every reasonable and impartial man 
would readily recognize its insufficiency.'70 
Hence, myopia vis-a-vis human rights allegations? It appears so - at least at first 
glance. However, what is peculiar — and the Tribunal did not entirely succeed in 
extinguishing such smack of peculiarity — is that the Tribunal chose to step back to 
the Neer case of 1926 without accepting any other development having occurred 
since as the customary international law minimum standard of treatment and 
applying the Neer principles so strictly in the case at hand. True enough, NAFTA 
tribunals have been more cautious regarding the interpretation of Article 1105 
NAFTA after the Commission interpretation of 2001 ensuing the broad Metalclad 
holding.71 Nonetheless, the limitedness and strictness with which the Tribunal 
chose to apply Article 1105 NAFTA is remarkable. While there is no express 
indication in the Glamis award and thus any consideration in this regard remains in 
the sphere of speculation, it does not seem entirely far-fetched that the Quechuan's 
cultural and ritual heritage at stake influenced the Tribunal's initial standard-
setting. 
IV. C O N C L U S I O N : S N E A K I N G T H R O U G H T H E 
B A C K D O O R 
(a) An ambivalent relationship 
At first glance, it is rather unsurprising that the analysed cases seem to support the 
premise introduced above72 - we observe the clear pattern that tribunals are 
utterly reluctant to refer direcdy to or even consider public interest argumentation. 
Sometimes, this hesitancy originates in the fact that the host State itself has 
contributed considerably to the situation it later claims to infringe its citizens' 
human rights or other public interest. In Azurix, e.g., the drinking water's 
infestation with bacteria was mosdy due to decades of shortcomings in the 
reparation and renovation of Buenos Aires' water and sewage system when it was 
still run by the local government.73 
In abstract terms, however, tribunals such as in Phoenix indeed acknowledge — in 
obiter dicta — that 
'nobody would suggest that ICSID protection should be granted to investments made in violation 
of die most fundamental rules of protection of human rights, like investments made in pursuance 
of torture or genocide or in support of slavery or trafficking of human organs.'74 
Neer v. Mexico, supra n. 68. 
71
 See Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States, Award, 30 Aug. 2000, Case No. ARB(AF)/97/ l . 
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Also, the Biwater award recognized that the outcome of the award was going to 
have an impact far beyond the bilateral relationship of the foreign investor and the 
host State. By stating that '[t]here is an undoubtedly public interest in this 
arbitration',75 the tribunal accepted that the respective dispute left the private 
sphere of a mere controversy between two parties over contractual matters and 
touched upon challenges which concern third persons or even society as a whole. 
However, the tribunal halted here. Beyond such general acknowledgement, there is 
scarce if any argumentation to be found that expressly refers to the public interest 
when it comes to the actual legal analysis. 
Hence, apart from rather hypothetical considerations investment tribunals 
apparently are very reluctant to take account of the public interest direcdy. Such 
reluctance, if not to say hostility, vis-a-vis public interest arguments cannot be 
explained by mere scepticism and ignorance. The roots must lie deeper than an 
alleged professional bias.76 Indeed, more and more eminent public international 
law scholars, many among them with a longstanding experience in the fields of 
human rights or international environmental law, become arbitrators in 
investment disputes, both under ICSID as well as NAFTA or other arbitration 
realms. As some scholars elucidate, the crux with public interest considerations lies 
in the question of the law applicable to an investment dispute.77 This, so some 
argue, further leads to the jurisdictional issue that the consent to arbitration is 
limited to the substance of the request for arbitration.78 Since international 
investment law — at least until now — lacks a solid theoretical foundation79 for the 
application of public international law norms beyond those enshrined in BITs, it is 
understandable that tribunals shy away from applying human rights or other 
public interest issues encapsulated in public international law norms, particularly if 
those may be asserted as defences against undisputable investor rights 
infringements.80 
Thus one is tempted to ask: Why do the tribunals say one thing — explicitly 
brushing away public interest arguments by the host State or the amici - and 
actually do another — granting them entrance through the backdoor so to speak? 
One reason I have already given: The lack of doctrinal and theoretical foundation 
Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, Decision on Petitions of Third Persons to Intervene as Amici 
Curiae, 15 Jan. 2001, para. 49; Biwater v. Tanzania, para. 358. 
As argued by van Harten, supra n. 4, 152 ff. 
P.M. Dupuy, 'Unification Rather than Fragmentation of International Law? The Case of International Investment Law and 
Human Right Law', in P.M. Dupuy, F. Francioni and E.-U. Petersmann (eds.), Human Rights in International 
Investment Law and Arbitration 45, 56 (Oxford U. Press 2009). 
C. Reiner and C. Schreuer, 'Human Rights and International Investment Arbitration', in P.M. Dupuy, F. Francioni 
and E.-U. Petersmann (eds.), Human Rights in International Investment Law and Arbitration 82 at 89 (Oxford U. 
Press 2009). 
This is not to belittle the work of McLachlan, among others, vis-a-vis Art. 31 (3)(c) of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties and systemic integration, cf. C. McLachlan, 'The Principle of Systemic Integration 
and Art. 31(3)(C) of the Vienna Convention' (2005) 54 Int'l Comp. L. Q. 279-320 and id., 'Investment Treaties 
and General International Law' (2008) 57 Int'l Comp. L. Q. 361^401, who has focused on the doctrinal rather 
than the theoretical foundation, however. Also see B. Simma, 'Foreign Investment Arbitration: A Place for Human 
Rights?' 60 Int'l Comp. L. Q. 573-596 (2011). 
However, see my attempt to remedy this in A. Kulick, supra n. 2. 
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in the tribunals' argumentation8'for integrating human rights considerations into 
the investment realm and thus their fear to exceed their powers by going beyond 
what the parties have consented to. 
This, however, merely explains why tribunals do not explicitly and directly 
consider public interest issues. It does not explain why they nonetheless do so 
implicidy and indirecdy. In my opinion, the answer is quite simple: Because they 
see themselves confronted with deciding disputes involving questions of public 
interest they cannot disregard. They start to acknowledge that their role goes 
beyond being mere arbiters of private issues. Whether an investor can construct 
and operate a landfill, whether its rights are violated by a host State banning the 
export or import of chemical substances or whether a city's withdrawal of the 
concession to provide water services triggers the investor's claim to damages all 
constitute questions that are just different flipsides of the same coin: They 
foreshadow that, viewed from the opposite angle, the questions pertaining to the 
very same issue are also whether the investor is permitted to construct the landfill 
and how it operates it in the vicinity of a local community, whether a host State 
may ban the export or import of chemical substances potentially harmful to the 
environment or human health or whether an investor has fulfilled its obligations 
under the concession agreement to provide clean water and other water and water 
sewage services. 
In the domestic realm, private contracts and disputes that exhibit such public 
interest relevance are usually embedded in a framework of public rules and 
regulations. Public procurement laws govern the tender, and shortcomings in 
providing the service or operating the site encounter responses by public law 
remedies, e.g. a fine or the rescission of the contract, usually administered by the 
executive. The Biwater Tribunal expressly recognizing the 'public interest' hence 
indicates the growing tendency in investment arbitration to acknowledge parallel 
needs in the international (investment) law realm, i.e. embedding the investor-host 
State dispute in a public law framework. 
(b) Backdoor or front door? 
Having thus made the point that investment arbitration tribunals in fact do care 
more about the public interest than they say expressly, I will now turn to how they 
factor it in doctrinally. The battlefield where the public interest actually unfolds its 
force is not (or not yet) to be found on the merits stage - here, as I have argued 
above, tribunals either decline to consider any public interest arguments or, as in 
Glands, seek to ground their holding on well-established public international law 
standards the interpretation of which, however, appears to be influenced by public 
interest considerations. 
However, the thrust of public interest considerations surfaces when it comes to 
what an investment dispute is eventually all about: compensation. I have argued 
In contrast to the valuable attempts in the literature, investment arbitration tribunals so far have not made 
reference to Art. 31 (3)(c) VCLT as an avenue for interpretation of a BIT, also cf. supra n. 79. 
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elsewhere82 that, in contrast to other international disputes, in investment 
arbitration, States care much less whether they are found to have violated 
international law. They do care first and foremost whether and how much 
compensation or damages they have to pay - particularly since even a lawful 
expropriation triggers the obligation to compensate. 
That tribunals often follow the backdoor pattern is most obvious in the Biwater 
and Azurix cases. While the argumentations revolving around the right to water 
failed on the merits stage, the arbitrators then considerably reduced compensation 
[Azurix) or denied compensation at all [Biwater), basing their argumentation on topoi 
similar to those they had declined to adopt regarding the merits.83 
In Biwater, the tribunal found that the investment's loss in value was not caused 
by the investor rights violations committed by the host State, for it was BGT's 
miscalculations that failed taking into account the adjustments necessary in the 
Dar es Salaam water system and the limits regarding licit increase of water 
prices.84 Similarly, the Azurix tribunal denied the investor recouping the USD 
438.6 million canon payment because a reasonable businessman would have been 
in no position to expect recovering the entire canon given the limits of water price 
increase and the renovation necessary to guarantee a well-functioning and clean 
water system.85 In both cases the tribunals' arguments can be boiled down to the 
following: The investor is only entitled to compensation within the limits of what it 
can expect recouping when warranting a well-functioning, clean water system to 
affordable prices for everyone. Differentiy put, the amount of compensation is 
influenced and limited by the core principles of the right to water, i.e. the public 
interest. 
However, the Glamis award is a good example that the indirect influence of 
human rights considerations begins to stretch beyond the confines of 
compensation. The Tribunal strictly harkening back to the JVeer case of 1926 to 
determine the international minimum standard of treatment according to Article 
1105 NAFTA appears to indirectiy honour human rights and other public interest 
considerations as outlined in the Quechuan Non-Party Submission.86 
It is not yet clear which avenue will establish as the choice of preference in 
international investment arbitration - the front door (i.e. dealing with public 
interest argumentation on the merits) or the back door (i.e. dealing with it on the 
level of compensation and damages). My conclusion assumes the latter. 
Finally, a question to be asked but not to be answered fully here is whether such 
latter solution is preferable. Indeed, it appears that nowadays it has become 
common sense that investment disputes inhere public interest issues the tribunals 
are unable to fully neglect. However, the clandestine existence public interest 
argumentation seems to eke out at the present stage does neither do a favour to 
See Kulick, supra n. 5, at 922. 
See supra III. 2. 
Biwater v. Tanzania, para. 786 ff. 
Azurix v. Argentina, para. 426. 
See supra III. 3. 
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public interest nor to investment arbitration. It remains for future investment 
arbitration tribunals to be more courageous and undertake a more open task in 
identifying and considering public interest argumentation. Doctrinally, the most 
preferable place for this is, in my opinion, indeed the level of compensation and 
damages.87 Not only is this, as I have argued before, eventually the most crucial 
issue for both the investor and the host State. Reconciling the public interest with 
the investors' individual interest also should preferably translate into a balancing of 
both aspects rather than into the rather blunt instrument of either finding for an 
infringement of investor rights on the merits stage. From the outset, the Biwater 
approach hence is preferable to the solution chosen in Glamis.88 The best tool for 
such balancing would be proportionality.89 The result of the proportionality 
analysis would then impact the measuring of the amount of compensation and 
damages.90 
See in this regard Liberti, supra n. 13, at 564 foreshadowing the balancing exercise. 
See supra III. 3. 
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